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Productivity, Pricing and Profitability 
in the U.S. Rail Freight Industry, 1995-2004
by Carl D. Martland
Rail industry productivity grew by 7% per year from 1984 to 1995, but most of the benefi ts to the 
industry were offset by reductions in rail rates and the increasing need for capital expenditures.  Rail 
rates declined by more than one-third during that period, while fi nancial measures, such as return on 
shareholders equity and net railway operating income, showed only a modest improvement.  From 
1995 to 2004, productivity improved 5% per year, prices continued to fall, and fi nancial performance 
was fl at or declining.  There is no doubt that productivity improvements helped railroads make very 
signifi cant reductions in their costs during this 20-year period. However, by 2004, the long-term 
trends were coming to an end. The rate of productivity improvement was declining, rates were 
starting to rise, and capacity and service problems were becoming more serious. With higher rates, 
many of the Class I railroads were coming close to earning their cost of capital. The combination 
of increasing profi tability, declining service, and inadequate capacity is unlikely to be sustainable. 
The lack of capacity and deteriorating service quality are seen as serious problems not only for 
rail customers, but for public agencies at the local, state, and federal levels. Railroads will need 
fi nancial and planning assistance from these agencies as they seek to provide suffi cient capacity to 
handle the potential growth in traffi c that is expected over the next 20 years. 
INTRODUCTION
This paper addresses historical trends concerning productivity, prices, and profi tability in the U.S. rail 
industry during the period 1995 to 2004.  Prior research documented the sources of the productivity 
improvements that were achieved by the railroads between 1965 and 1995 (Martland 1999).  Both 
the beginning and the end of that period were reasonably good years for the rail industry.  In between, 
the industry struggled through fi nancial diffi culties, responded to major regulatory changes, and 
rationalized its network and operations. Throughout that period, productivity improvements 
provided annual benefi ts on the order of $25 billion per year by 1995, a year when actual operating 
expenses for the Class I railroads were just under $28 billion. If railroad productivity had been the 
same as in 1965, operating expenses in 1995 would have exceeded $53 billion.  Had prices remained 
at 1965 levels (in constant dollar terms), rail industry profi ts would also have increased on the order 
of $25 billion.  In fact, prices fell signifi cantly following deregulation of the rail industry in 1980, 
and rail profi ts were less than $4 billion in 1995, or about the same in constant dollar terms as in the 
mid-1960s or the mid-1980s. Despite improvements that often exceeded 7% per year in physical 
productivity, rail industry fi nancial performance was essentially unchanged from the mid-1960s to 
the mid-1990s.  
Martland (1999) predicted that the railroad industry was likely to encounter fi nancial problems 
because the pressure on prices would be expected to continue, while the rate of productivity growth 
would decline.  At the time, this was a contrarian view.  The rail industry was then in relatively 
good fi nancial shape, and various industry leaders and consultants lauded prospects for the future 
– so long as the industry was not re-regulated (e.g., Morrison and Winston 1999, Harper 1996, 
Gallamore 1998, and Rennicke 1998).  Martland (1999), therefore, struck a rather discordant note 
with  pessimistic conclusions regarding profi tability and the industry’s ability to deal with capacity, 
service quality, and other strategic problems.
Morrison and Winston (1999) presented a different view of the rail industry’s history and its 
prospects for the future.  From their perspective, deregulation had been the key to transforming the 
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rail industry from a system that provided poor service to customers and stockholders to one that was 
able to “lower its costs and pass on these cost reductions in the form of lower prices and better service 
to customers.”  They identify computers, double-stack container trains, improved communications, 
and many other technological and operating innovations that directly led to higher productivity; but 
they argue that these advances were realized only because of the new incentives that deregulation 
gave to fi rms.  Gallamore (1999, p. 495) espoused similar views, but he also called for research to 
fi gure out what actually happened: “A strong before-and-after case cries out for examination, as it 
is apparent that railroads foundered under the fi nal decades of Interstate Commerce Commission 
(ICC) regulation and have recovered remarkably since regulation was relaxed in 1980.”  He goes 
on to identify many of the technological and institutional changes that happened after deregulation, 
changes that he believed were in fact caused by or accelerated by deregulation.
The goal of this paper is to provide some insight into the extent and sources of productivity 
improvement in the rail industry since 1995, and to consider the extent to which productivity 
improvement has been translated into improved fi nancial performance.  This paper, therefore, 
provides some input relevant to Gallamore’s call for a detailed before-and-after assessment of the 
impacts of deregulation.
This paper is primarily concerned with the period 1995-2004.  During this period, major mergers 
transformed the national network, while burgeoning traffi c challenged the capabilities of the system. 
Problems in consummating the mergers, diffi culties in expanding capacity to keep pace with traffi c 
growth, and severe weather resulted in extended periods of congestion, service complaints, and public 
outrage concerning rail performance.  While the industry did manage substantial improvements in 
productivity, most of the benefi ts were once again passed on to rail customers in terms of lower 
rates.  As a result, fi nancial performance for the industry peaked around 1996, then stabilized at a 
lower level through 2004.
The paper presents two levels of analysis regarding productivity: one based upon aggregate 
measures and one based on a more detailed analysis of specifi c sources of productivity improvement. 
Both levels of analysis indicate improvements on the order of 50% during the nine-year period. 
Productivity improvement of this magnitude is benefi cial to society because fewer resources will be 
needed to move freight by rail. Substantial productivity improvement does not automatically result 
in improved fi nancial performance for companies or an industry because prices are determined in 
the marketplace. For many years, declining prices for rail service offset the savings to the railroads 
from productivity improvements. As a result, fi nancial performance was relatively stable.  Only in 
2004 did rail prices begin to rise, allowing better fi nancial performance despite service problems and 
rising costs related to capacity constraints.
TRENDS IN PRODUCTIVITY, PRICING, AND PROFITABILITY, 1995-2004
In this research, output was measured in terms of its value to the customer.  Each shipment was 
viewed as a different type of output, and total output was measured by weighting each shipment by 
the price that was paid.  Over time, output can change because of a change in traffi c volume, traffi c 
mix, or price.  An output index was created for each year by dividing freight revenue by a price index, 
a technique that has been used in other studies of railroad productivity (e.g., Waters 1997).  For the 
period 1984 to 1999, it was possible to use the price index developed by the Surface Transportation 
Board (2000).  This index compares prices for similar movements during different time periods, and 
it has been found to be the best of the available measures of rail price (Dennis 2005).  For the period 
from 2000 to 2004, changes in prices were assumed to be proportional to the changes in the constant 
dollar revenue per ton-mile as reported by the Association of American Railroads.1 
The fi rst three rows of Table 1 show the absolute values for carloads, tons, and revenue ton-
miles for the base year 1995 and for 2000 to 2004.  The next three rows show the same information 
expressed as indices, with the base year equal to 100.  The last three rows show the key factors used 
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to create a more general output index.  Freight revenue is converted to output by dividing by the 
price index and comparing the results to the base year 1995.  
Table 1: Class I Railroad Output, Various Measures, 1995-2004
1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Carloads (million) 23.7 27.8 27.2 27.9 28.7 30.1
Tons (million) 1549 1738 1742 1767 1779 1844
Ton-Miles (billion) 1306 1466 1495 1507 1551 1663
Carloads (index) 100 117 115 118 121 127
Tons (index) 100 112 113 114 116 119
Ton-Miles (index) 100 112 114 115 119 117
Freight Revenue 
(billion) $31.4 $33.1 $33.5 $34.1 $35.4 $39.1
Price Index 100 86.9 84.3 83.7 82.9 83.3
Output Index 100 121 127 131 136 150
Data source:  AAR, Railroad Facts, 2005.
The output index, which grew to 150 by 2004, increased more rapidly than the indices for carloads, 
tons, and ton-miles because it relates to prices rather than to physical measures.  Some commodities 
with relatively high revenue per ton – especially shipments of intermodal containers and of 
automobiles – have been growing more rapidly than shipments of bulk traffi c. The slight shift away 
from bulk traffi c means that the industry is getting slightly more revenue from commodity groups 
where revenue per ton or ton-mile is either growing faster or declining less rapidly than for other 
commodity groups.
Total inputs include all freight expenses, i.e., all of the people, equipment, facilities, fuel, and 
supplies required to operate the system. The Railroad Cost Recovery Index (RCR), which has been 
produced by the Association of American Railroads for more than 50 years as a measure of infl ation 
in the price levels of rail inputs, was used to restate rail operating expenses in terms of base year 
costs (Table 2). The operating expense was divided by the RCR, and the result was divided by the 
1995 operating expense to get the input index.  The index fell from 100 to 87.8 in 2002, then rose to 
95.3 in 2004.  Table 3 indicates strong productivity growth through 2004, as inputs declined despite 
substantial growth in output. The increase of 57% from 1995 to 2004 is equivalent to an average 
increase of 5% per year compounded over this nine-year period.  
Table 2: Railroad Inputs, 1995-2004
1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Class I Railroads
Operating Expense (Billions) $27.90 $29.04 $29.16 $29.59 $31.44 $35.11
Railroad Cost Recovery Index 100 116.6 120.0 120.8 125.19 132.11
Input Index 100 89.2 87.1 87.8 90.0 95.3
Data source:  AAR, Railroad Facts, 2005.
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Table 3: Railroad Productivity, 1995-2004
1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Output Index (Table 1) 100 121 127 131 136 150
Input Index (Table 2) 100 89.2 87.1 87.8 90.0 95.3
Productivity Index 100 136 146 148 151 157
The productivity index is estimated as the ratio of the output index to the input index.
Improvements in productivity do not necessarily translate into fi nancial improvements, which also 
depend on trends in rates and in unit costs. If productivity improves and rail prices keep pace with 
infl ation in costs, then profi ts also improve. Table 4 provides summary comparisons for productivity, 
prices, and profi ts for the entire period 1995-2004. Productivity rose sharply during this period, as 
shown in the fi rst row of the table. However, prices not only failed to keep pace with infl ation, but 
declined. Taking 1995 as the base year, the ratio of the price index (Table 1) to the Railroad Cost 
Recovery Index (Table 2) fell to 0.63 by 2004. The overall effect on profi tability was very small, as 
is evident in the combined index, which is the product of the factors shown in the fi rst two lines of 
the table.  
Table 4: Productivity, Prices, and Profi ts, 1995-2004
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Productivity 100 115 118 119 124 136 146 148 151 157
Price Index/
Cost Index 100 .94 .90 .86 .84 0.74 0.70 0.69 0.66 .63
Combined Index 100 .992
NROI (billion) $2.9 $4.3 $4.0 $3.7 $4.0 $3.9 $4.1 $4.2 $4.1 $4.1
Data source:  AAR, Railroad Facts, 2005.
This analysis confi rms the results of the previous study (Martland 1999).  Overall productivity 
continued to rise in the rail industry through 2004, but the benefi ts to the railroads were again offset 
by declines in rail rates.  As a result, net railway operating income (NROI) peaked in 1996 at $4.34 
billion, but was lower in each of the next seven years.   
Have Rates Really Declined?
The STB estimated that the reductions in rail rates since deregulation in 1980 were equivalent to 
nearly $32 billion in 1999.  This number was consistent with the conclusion of Martland (1999) 
that rate reductions had amounted to $25 billion in 1995.  Several challenges have been made to 
the STB’s methodology – and by implication to the similar methodology used in this research.  For 
example, see the strongly negative reaction to the STB study reported in Traffi c World (Wilner 
2000) and the equally strong support for the STB results published subsequently (Rockey 2001).  
Shippers are generally less concerned with absolute rates than with equitable rates, i.e., their 
rates versus the rates offered to their competitors.  It appears that rate differentials – the differences in 
rail rates paid by different customers for similar services – have increased for some, even while rate 
levels have declined for most. This can result in what customers regard as inequitable.  For example, 
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two railroad customers may be competing with each other to sell their products, which they ship by 
rail.  Customer A’s rates may have declined by 10% over the past 25 years, but Customer B’s rates 
may have declined by 40%.  In this case, the rate differential has increased and Customer A may, as 
a result, lose some of its market share to Customer B.   The STB response to such concerns was that 
deregulation has provided railroads the freedom to set differential rates depending upon the value of 
the service to customers and the extent of competition for the product (Surface Transportation Board 
2000).  Therefore, some rates may well have risen or declined only slightly, but the STB concluded 
that the overwhelming evidence is that average rates have fallen.
Another complaint is that there has been a shift in traffi c mix that results in a lower average rate, 
even though the rates may have been the same or higher for each traffi c class.  The STB addressed 
this issue by breaking out separate rate indices for eastern and western traffi c; while the western 
traffi c did indeed show a greater decline than in the east, the declines in both regions were steady 
and substantial. The STB also noted that average revenue per ton declined or remained stable for 
most of the major traffi c groups after deregulation despite increases in the average length of haul 
(Surface Transportation Board 2000).
A more serious contention is that the services provided by the railroads are not the same services 
that were provided 10 or 20 years ago.  There are several important concerns.  First, the railroads 
have shifted much of the burden of fl eet ownership to the customers.  In 1980, car companies and 
rail customers owned 26% of the car fl eet, but their share of the fl eet increased to 37% by 1990 and 
50% by 2000 (AAR 2005).  The net effect over this 20-year period was that customers purchased 
more than a quarter of a million freight cars that in prior days might have been purchased by the 
railroads.  At an average cost per car of about $50,000 over most of this period (as reported in 
Railroad Facts), it is clear that shippers and car companies made an investment of $10 to $15 billion 
in equipment.  Shifting ownership and maintenance responsibilities to customers surely increased 
their costs.  However, the STB concluded that the total cost would amount to only about $3 billion 
per year, which is a small fraction of the annual savings of more than $30 billion that were achieved 
from productivity savings in the rail industry and passed on to customers in the form of lower 
rates.
Another valid concern is that the railroads achieved a considerable portion of their productivity 
savings through rationalization of the network and structuring rates so as to promote multi-car 
shipments and unit trains.  To take advantage of these services, some customers had to invest in 
facilities capable of handling much larger shipments, while others – especially farmers –  complained 
that their costs rose for bringing their product to the rail head.  This complaint is true, as the cost 
savings from line abandonment and facility consolidation are offset to some extent by the added 
costs to shippers who may face higher costs for storage or for access to more distant rail shipping 
points.  The reductions in rail rates, therefore, do not equal the savings to shippers who may face 
higher logistics expense elsewhere. 
A fi nal valid concern is that service levels have not been constant.  During the late 1990s, the 
rail industry suffered a series of prolonged periods of congestion that were highlighted in the general 
business press and generally attributed to diffi culties in mergers (Jesdanum 1999, Machalaba 1999, 
and Gallagher 2002). Another explanation could be that decades of down-sizing coupled with strong 
growth in train-miles had put the industry on a course where the shrinking facilities would at some 
point be unable to handle the incremental traffi c.  Whatever the ultimate cause, there were major 
service complaints following Union Pacifi c’s mergers, fi rst with Chicago & Northwestern and then 
with Southern Pacifi c; a couple of bad winters led to serious problems for grain exports in the 
northwest, especially for the Canadian ports; the CSX and Norfolk Southern acquisition and the 
division of Conrail led to more problems. Congestion increases trip times, reduces reliability, forces 
customers to pay more for inventory or use more expensive modes, and causes railroads to lose 
business or hurt relationships with their customers.   
Taking all of these factors together, it is clear that the price reductions cited above, while real 
to the rail industry, have to some extent been offset by costs shifted to rail customers.  The railroads 
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have also achieved some of their productivity gains at the expense of losing capacity in the system, 
so that periods of congestion have become major concerns for customers and possibly placed major 
constraints on growth for the industry.  Still, it is clear that rail rates have indeed declined by amounts 
that are suffi cient to explain why the more than $25 billion in annual productivity improvements 
had not, as of 2004, resulted in higher rail profi tability.  The continuing pressures of the competitive 
freight transport market made it very diffi cult for the rail industry to capture long-term fi nancial 
benefi ts from their very successful efforts to improve productivity.
SOURCES OF PRODUCTIVITY IMPROVEMENT, 1995-2004
The aggregate analysis shown above cannot shed much light on the sources of productivity 
improvement. More detailed analysis is necessary to estimate the importance of specifi c 
technological or institutional factors infl uencing productivity improvement.  This section considers 
the direct effects of such things as heavier trains, more effi cient equipment, improved maintenance 
technologies, and advances in computers and communications.  Together, these innovations have 
provided benefi ts that are suffi cient to explain the cost reductions and productivity improvements 
identifi ed in the aggregate analysis.   
Service Units per Unit of Output
Heavy haul railroading and intermodalism are two long-term trends in equipment and traffi c mix 
that have allowed the railroads to move more freight with fewer resources.  Heavy haul railroading 
refers to a series of technological and operating improvements that allow the use of larger cars, more 
powerful locomotives, and longer trains.  The growth of intermodal transportation has resulted in a 
shift in traffi c mix that favors lighter shipments that do not require complex handling in classifi cation 
yards or movement on light density lines.  Both trends reduce the costs per unit of output.
Larger, lighter cars. Larger cars carry more freight, and the capacity of cars rises faster than their 
cost or weight.  With larger cars, the ratio of gross tonnage (weight of equipment plus contents) to 
net tonnage (weight of contents) declines.  Better car designs and use of aluminum or other light-
weight materials have also reduced this ratio, thereby leading to savings in fuel consumption, track 
maintenance, and train crews by allowing the same amount of freight to be carried in fewer trains.   
Unit trains. A unit train can be used to transport coal, grain, or ore from a single origin to a single 
destination, avoiding the need to handle cars at intermediate yards.  With unit trains, costs per ton-
mile decline because fewer switching yards are needed, much less time is spent for each trip (e.g., 
cycle times of a week or so versus two to three weeks for traditional single car shipments), and 
locomotive utilization is higher.
Shift from general service to intermodal. Intermodal movement of trailers or containers replaces 
complex and expensive terminal switching by railroads with more effi cient short haul truck moves. 
Intermodal trains provide service to a hundred or so major intermodal terminals, while traditional 
rail service involved more than a thousand classifi cation yards.  Therefore, increases in intermodal 
traffi c, plus declines in general merchandise, reduce the capacity needed in classifi cation yards.  
Shift from TOFC/COFC to Double-Stack Intermodal Trains. Further improvements in 
intermodal service have been obtained by using double-stack container trains. A double-stack train 
carries almost twice as many containers as a standard COFC (Container on Flat Car) or TOFC 
(Trailer on Flat Car) train.  Hence, there are dramatic savings in crew costs and benefi ts in terms of 
line capacity.  Moreover, the empty weight of double-stack trains is low, providing benefi ts in terms 
of reduced equipment cost, lower fuel costs, and lower track maintenance.
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The benefi ts from these kinds of productivity improvements were estimated by a three-step 
process.  The fi rst step was to calculate the number of gross ton-miles, train-miles, car-miles, and 
carloads per unit of output for each year (i.e., the output index in Table 1).  These service units 
(SU) were selected because they refl ect key aspects of rail operations that are affected by heavy 
haul railroading and intermodalism.  The next step was to calculate the number of gross ton-miles, 
train-miles, car-miles, and carloads that would have been required for each year if the ratios of 
service units per unit of output were the same as in the base year.  The third step was to calculate 
cost savings by multiplying the reductions in service units by estimated unit costs for the base year 
of 19952:
• $5/train-mile
• $0.06/freight car-mile
• $2.50/1000 gross ton-miles 
• $150/load
Table 5 shows the benefi ts estimated for the period 1995 to 2004.  If the service units had 
increased proportionately with the output measure shown in Table 1, then annual costs would have 
been $3.6 billion higher by 2004, which represents an annual improvement of $0.4 billion for this 
period.  For comparison, the results of Martland (1999) are shown for 1995 versus 1983.  That study 
included savings from yard switching hours, which are no longer reported in Railroad Facts and 
were not included for the current period.
Table 5: Estimated Savings from Changes in SU/Unit of Output
Service Unit Unit Cost SU/Output, 2004
Reduction 
in SU 2004
SU Savings  
2004 v. 1995
SU Savings 
1995 v. 1983
Train-miles $5 .779 152 million $0.8 billion $1.0 billion
Car-miles $0.06 .811 8.62 billion $0.5 billion $0.6 billion
Carloads $150 .846 5.46 million $0.8 billion $1.9 billion
Gross Ton-miles $2.50 per 1000 .849 590 billion $1.5 billion $1.5 billion
Yard Switching 
Hours $100
Not 
Available $1.7 billion
Total $3.6 billion $6.7 billion
Savings/year $0.40 billion $0.55 billion
Data Sources:  service units from AAR (2005); unit costs from Martland (1999).
Fuel Effi ciency
The next step in the detailed productivity analysis is to consider changes in the amount of resources 
required per service unit.  This paper considers three major resources where there were continuing 
productivity improvements:  fuel, employees, and track.  The paper does not consider freight cars, as 
this was not found to be a source of productivity improvement over the period in question.  For each 
resource, it is possible to consider changes in the amount of resources required and the price of the 
resource.  This section considers fuel effi ciency. Subsequent sections address labor and track.
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The introduction of larger, more effi cient locomotives helped railroads to improve fuel effi ciency, 
as did the increase in vehicle capacity mentioned earlier. The fi rst three rows of Table 6 show the 
gallons of fuel used by the Class I railroads, the average price per gallon, and the revenue ton-miles 
(RTM) per gallon.  The next two rows show how increases in fuel effi ciency led to reductions in fuel 
consumption and fuel cost, assuming the 1995 price of $0.60 per gallon.  The reduction in fuel usage 
was estimated as the product of revenue ton-miles in each year multiplied by the change in gallons 
per revenue ton-mile relative to the base year of 1995.  The next row shows the effect of the increase 
in fuel prices, which reached $1.07 in 2004.  The effect of the change in fuel price was estimated 
as the actual gallons consumed in each year multiplied by the change in the price of fuel per gallon 
relative to the price in the base year. The combined effect was negative, as the price increases for 
fuel more than offset all the fuel economy gains.   In contrast, in the 12-year period before 1995, fuel 
effi ciency and declining fuel prices provided a net benefi t to the railroads; fuel costs in 1995 would 
have been $0.9 billion higher if fuel effi ciency and fuel costs had remained at 1984 levels. 
Table 6: Fuel Effi ciency and Fuel Cost, 1995-2004
1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Gallons (million) 3480 3700 3710 3730 3826 4059
Price/gallon $0.60 $0.87 $0.86 $0.73 $0.89 $1.07
RTM/gallon 375 396 403 404 405 410
Reduction in gallons 0 206 274 286 307 371
Benefi t @ 1995 price 0 $124 $164 $171 $184 $223
Effect of change in 
fuel price (million) 0 ($1016) ($947) ($497) ($1109) ($1,907)
Net benefi t (million) 0 ($892) ($783) ($326) ($925) ($1,684)
Data Source:  AAR, Railroad Facts, 2005.
Employee Productivity
Employee productivity was estimated using a methodology developed by Banner and Brosnan 
(1983) that was applied in earlier studies of railroad productivity (Martland 1989 and 1999).  If 
labor productivity was unchanged, then the number of employees required would vary directly 
with the relevant service unit.3  The Association of American Railroads (in Railroad Facts) reports 
the number of employees and their average compensation by major category as well as the major 
service units. Thus, it is possible to estimate labor productivity for any particular year and the 
changes in productivity over a period of years. The fi rst three columns of Table 7 show the service 
units used for each category, the change in service units between 1995 and 2004, and the change in 
employees over the same period.  If there had been no changes in employee productivity, then the 
percentage change in employees would have been the same as the percentage change in the relevant 
service unit. In fact, employment fell in all but one category despite increases in the number of 
service units. The number of additional employees that would have been required if the ratio of 
employees to service unit (EPSU) was the same in 2004 as it was in the base year of 1995 was 
calculated as follows:
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Added employees = SU2004 * (EPSU95 – EPSU04)
The cost savings were estimated by multiplying the reduction in employees in each category by their 
average annual wages in 1995 (last column of Table 7). 
Table 7: Improvements in Employee Productivity, 1995-2004
Service 
Unit
Increase in 
Service Units 
1995-2004
Change in 
Employment
2004 Cost Saving 
@ 1995 wages
($Billions)
Executives, 
Offi cials and 
staff
Carloads 27% -15% $0.35
Professional & 
Administration Carloads 27% -49% $0.910
Maintenance 
of Way & 
Structures
Revenue 
ton-miles 27% -16% $0.67
Maintenance of 
Equipment Car-miles 22% -21% $0.56
Transportation, 
other than Train 
& Engine
Train-miles 17% -22% $0.17
Transportation, 
Train & Engine Train-miles 17% 1% $0.57
Total ($ billions) $3.23
Data Source:  AAR, Railroad Facts, 2005.
These results indicate a continuing improvement in productivity in each area, with a total benefi t 
of $3 billion per year by the end of the period.    However, if these results are compared with those 
for 1983-1995, the rate of improvement was slower, as is evident by considering the three largest 
categories of savings: 
Train Crew Productivity. Between 1983 and 1995, the industry implemented reductions in crew 
consist and changes in labor agreements that produced a dramatic reduction in the number of 
people required to run trains.  As described in the earlier study, the average train and engine (T&E) 
employees per 10,000 train-miles dropped from 2.75 in 1983 to 1.39 in 1995, leading to a benefi t 
of nearly $5 billion per year by 1995.  The decline continued, but at a much slower rate to 1.16 by 
2003, and then increased to 1.20 in 2004.  As of 2004, the additional benefi t was only $0.57 billion 
dollars/year at 1995 wage rates.  The annual incremental benefi ts were less than $0.1 billion per year 
after 1995 compared with $0.4 billion per year in the 1983-1995 period.
Offi ce Automation. Between 1983 and 1995, the number of employees in the professional & 
administrative category declined from 68,000 to 27,000 for a savings of $1.8 billion.  If that number 
were adjusted for the 25% increase in carloads handled by 1995, then the savings would have been 
increased to $2.5 billion, i.e., over $0.2 billion per year for the 12-year period.  The number of 
professional & administrative employees continued to decline through 2004, but at a slower pace, 
resulting in savings of $0.1 billion per year (i.e., $0.9 billion savings at 1995 wage rates over the 
nine years from 1995 to 2004).
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Maintenance of Way (MOW). Between 1983 and 1995, the number of employees in this category 
declined nearly 40%, from 64,000 to 40,000, despite an increase in ton-miles of nearly 60%.  If the 
number of employees per ton-mile had remained the same, 2.5 times as many employees would have 
been needed in 1995 as in 1983.  At the average wage in 1995, the payroll for MOW would have 
jumped from $1.56 billion to $3.8 billion. In 2004, if the number of employees per ton-mile had 
remained the same as in 1995, then the percentage increase in MOW employees would have been 
the same as the 27% increase in ton-miles. To put this into more understandable terms, employment 
was declining at 3% per year during the 1983-1995 period when ton-miles were growing at 4% per 
year; this led to a very large increase in MOW productivity.  In the more recent 1995-2004 period, 
employment declined at a rate of 2% per year while ton-miles were growing at a rate of 3% per year. 
The work force continued to decline while the demand on the track structure continued to grow, 
but the rate of productivity improvement and the rate of traffi c growth were both lower than in the 
earlier period.  
Facility Rationalization
The U.S. rail network reached its largest extent in the 1920s and has been declining ever since.  The 
pace of decline was accelerated during the 1980s, but declined by the end of the 1990s.  Table 8 
shows the miles of route and track owned by the Class I railroads.4  This exhibit starts with the peak 
in 1929 and shows the continuous decline since then.  
Table 8: Miles of Route and Track Owned, Class I Carriers
Year Route-Miles Track-Miles
1929 229,530 381,417
1939 220,915 360,174
1955 211,459 350,217
1965 199,798 324,788
1975 191,520 310,941
1985 145,764 242,320
1995 108,264 180,419
2000 99,250 168,535
2004 97,662 167,312
Source:  AAR, Railroad Facts, 2005.
Between 1975 and 1995, the route-miles owned by the Class I railroads dropped by 4,000 miles per 
year, while the track-miles dropped by more than 6,000 miles per year.  The reduction in route-miles 
owned resulted from the abandonment of branch lines and spinning off portions of the network to be 
operated by local or regional carriers. The greater reduction in track-miles refl ects the elimination 
of yard tracks and the reduction of tracks in some multi-track segments. Between 1995 and 2004, 
the rate of route rationalization declined. There was a reduction of only about 1,100 miles per year 
in route-miles and a reduction of barely 1,500 miles per year in track miles. The slowdown in 
rationalization is an indicator that the opportunities for eliminating redundant track were declining. 
In some well-publicized cases, such as the UP’s coal route in Nebraska, railroads found that they 
needed to add a second or third main line in order to handle record tonnages.  In many more cases, 
they added sidings to allow more frequent trains or extended sidings to allow longer trains.  
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Summary of Productivity Benefi ts
Table 9 summarizes the benefi ts described in this section.  It is important to understand that the 
savings in the “total” column are the total savings for one year based upon the cumulative productivity 
improvements made since the base year.  Thus, in 1995, costs would have been $18 billion higher if 
productivity in these areas had been the same as in 1983.  Likewise, in 2004, costs (in 1995 dollars) 
would have been $7 billion higher if productivity had been at the same level as in 1995.  These 
benefi ts are additive, so that the annual benefi ts would have been greater than $25 billion by 2004 if 
compared to a base year of 1983.  The fi gures in the “Annual” columns represent the rate of increase 
of annual benefi ts over the period.  The pace of productivity improvement declined by nearly 50%, 
while increases in fuel prices became a much more signifi cant factor affecting total expenditures 
for fuel.
Table 9: Summary of Annual Cost Reductions Resulting From Productivity Improvements 
 by U. S. Class I Railroads, 1983 to 2004 (in billions of 1995 dollars)
1995 v. 1983
Total
1995 v. 1983 
Annual
2004 v. 1995 
Total
2004 v. 1995 
Annual
Reduction in SU per unit of 
Output $6.7 $0.56 $4.3 $0.48
MOW Productivity (Labor 
only) $2.2 $0.18 $0.67 $0.074
MOW Productivity (Other) $2.8 $0.23 $0.9* $0.1
Offi ce Technology    $2.5** $0.21 $0.91 $0.1
T&E Employees $3.3 $0.27 $0.74 $0.08
Fuel Effi ciency (@ 1995 
price of $0.60/gallon) *** $0.54 $0.045 $0.22 $0.024
Total, Productivity Effect $18 $1.5/yr $7 $0.8/yr
Fuel Price Effect ($0.8) ($0.07) ($1.9) ($0.2)
Total, Productivity Plus 
Fuel Price Change $17 $1.5/yr $5 $0.6./yr
Data Sources:  AAR Railroad Facts, various years; Martland (1999)
* The improvement in MOW productivity for 1995 was based upon a very detailed analysis 
undertaken at that time.  The estimate for 2004 assumes a similar ratio between savings for labor 
and savings for other inputs, which would include savings in materials and in track machinery based 
upon longer lives for track components.
 ** The offi ce technology savings were increased from $1.8 billion in Martland (1999) to $2.5 
billion to be consistent with the methodology used in the other areas, as described in the text.
***  Fuel savings are based upon changes in RTM/gallon rather than gallons per unit of output.
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PRODUCTIVITY AND PROFITABILITY
Although the Class I railroads achieved very substantial improvements in productivity between 
1995 and 2004, they were unable to translate these improvements into steady increases in any of the 
commonly used fi nancial measures (Table 10).  If net railway operating income (NROI) is viewed 
in constant dollars, there was no sustained improvement over this period, nor was performance 
superior to what was achieved in the early 1980s.  The NROI was $2.5 billion in 1984, which would 
be $3.6 billion in 1995 dollars.  The same stable performance is evident with respect to return on net 
investment and rate of return on shareholders’ equity.  If anything, all of these fi nancial measures 
peaked some time between 1994 and 1996 and declined through 2004.  
Table 10: Financial Performance of the U.S. Class I Railroads, 1990-2004
Year NROI$billion
NROI *
1995 $
$billion
Return 
on Net 
Investment
Return on 
Equity
Capital 
Expenditures
$billion
1990 $2.68 $3.03 8.11% 8.18% $3.64
1991 (0.04) (0.04) Nil Nil 3.44
1992 1.95 2.09 6.3% 7.93% 3.61
1993 2.52 2.63 7.06% 9.38% 4.18
1994 3.39 3.47 9.37% 12.68% 4.89
1995 2.86 2.86 7.04% 7.93% 5.99
1996 4.34 4.25 9.36% 12.21% 6.10
1997 3.98 3.83 7.56% 9.27% 6.27
1998 3.67 3.79 7.00% 8.69% 7.20
1999 4.05 3.67 6.93% 9.36% 6.63
2000 3.92 3.68 6.48% 7.95% 6.06
2001 4.11 3.67 6.85% 7.96% 5.43
2002 4.25 3.77 7.04% 8.28% 5.67
2003 4.01 3.55 6.33% 6.65% 5.86
2004 4.15 3.52 6.12% 6.16% 6.24
Data Sources:  AAR Railroad Facts various years 
* Defl ated using the same approach used by the AAR to defl ate revenue per ton-mile 
Table 10 also documents the increases in capital expenditures over this period, which is another 
fi nancial concern.  Capital expenditures by the Class I railroads fi rst exceeded $5 billion in 1995; as 
of 2004, they had exceeded that amount in every subsequent year.   Capital expenditures peaked in 
1998 when railroads were struggling to deal with their capacity and service problems.  Over long 
periods of time, capital expenditures for track and equipment will tend to be proportional to traffi c 
volumes, especially as measured by ton-miles. Rail and ties must be renewed, and additional cars 
and locomotives will be needed to maintain and expand the size of the fl eet.  Between 1983 and 
1995, an average of 26,000 cars were added to the fl eet each year; expenditures for freight cars 
were limited during this period because there had been a large surplus of general equipment at the 
beginning.  By the mid-1990s, these surpluses were largely eliminated, and equipment purchases 
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accelerated to an average of 49,000 freight cars per year between 1996 and 2004 (Railroad Facts 
various years).  It is likely that capital expenditures will continue to rise if traffi c increases.5 How 
that capital will be raised will be a very serious problem for the industry.
NEW TRENDS IN 2005 
This paper was originally intended to address productivity, prices, and profi tability only through 
2004, the most recent year for which all of the relevant data were available at the time this paper 
was written.  However, trends that had continued for 20 years came to an end in 2004, prices rose 
and profi tability increased to record levels in 2005.  Table 11 provides illustrative data for the four 
largest U.S. railroads.  While this is not exactly the same information used in the prior analysis, 
the main trends are very clearly evident.  The fi rst line shows that total traffi c volume increased 
by about 2%, whether measured by carloads or revenue ton-miles. As shown in Table 1, output (as 
used in this paper) has been rising faster than either tons or ton-miles, so that output likely increased 
by more than 2% in 2005. The increases in revenue were much greater, averaging 13% for these 
railroads. If we assume that output increased at 3%, then the increase in price per unit of output 
would be approximately 10% (estimated as 1.13/1.03).  Operating expenses increased more rapidly 
than either carloads or ton-miles. The average increase of 7.6% was approximately the same as the 
8% increase in rail costs in 2005 (Surface Transportation Board 2006).  The operating ratio – the 
ratio of operating expense to operating revenue – is a fi nancial indicator commonly used by railroads 
and investment analysts.  Since revenues rose faster than costs in 2005, the operating ratio declined 
for each of these railroads, and net income nearly doubled.  Higher prices and improved fi nancial 
performance were also reported by these railroads for the fi rst half of 2006.
  
Table 11: Selected Operating and Financial Measures for the Largest U.S. Railroads in 2005
BNSF CSX NS UP Total
Carloads 5.1% -0.5% 4.3% 0.9% 2.1%
Ton-Miles 4.5% 3.2% 2.3% 0.5% 2.2%
Revenue 17.4% 7.2% 16.6% 7.9% 13.1%
Operating Expense 8.7% 0.3% 14.3% 7.9% 7.6%
Operating Ratio -8.9% -6.4% -2.0% -2.9% -5.1%
Net Income 94% 238% 40% 70% 88%
Data Source:  Annual Reports, Burlington Northern Santa Fe, CSX, Norfolk Southern, Union   
         Pacifi c
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
As predicted in prior research, most of the trends that followed deregulation of the rail industry 
continued during the period 1995 to 2004.  Productivity improved, but the rate of improvement 
declined; the reduction in real rail rates continued, and fi nancial performance deteriorated.  The 
industry that in 1995 was considered by many to be in the midst of a renaissance, found itself beset 
with problems related to service and capacity and still struggling to cover their cost of capital.  By 
2004, the industry found itself in a situation where rapid growth in traffi c had led to serious capacity 
and service problems, both of which detracted from the value of rail service to customers.  
With respect to pricing, the lack of capacity proved - at least between 2004 and 2006 - to be 
more powerful than intra-rail competition, with the ironic result that the ability to raise rates only 
came during a period of deteriorating rail service.  Higher prices were possible in part because of 
rising marginal costs as the system approached capacity, and in part because of a change in the 
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industry’s competitive position versus intercity trucking.  Since fuel costs have a greater impact on 
trucks than on the more energy effi cient railroads, the rapid rise in fuel costs provided an important 
competitive advantage for the rail industry in 2005 and 2006.  
Rail capacity has become a matter of concern to the public, refl ecting frustration with highway 
congestion and a desire to move trucks off the highways.  The ability of the rail network to handle 
more traffi c has also become a major issue for public offi cials.  Many of them question the willingness 
and ability of the industry to make the investments that will be required if rail is to maintain or 
increase its market share (e.g., Grenzback et al. 2003).   Given the public’s interest in these issues, 
it is uncertain whether the recent pattern of declining rail service, restricted rail capacity, and rising 
rail rates will be sustainable.
Rail capacity is simply too important a concern for public agencies to ignore.  And they are 
not ignoring it.  In April 2006, the U.S. House Sub-Committee on Rail conducted a hearing on 
“The U.S. Rail Capacity Crunch,” demonstrating their interest in capacity, equity in pricing, service 
quality, and the common carrier obligation.  In July 2006, the bipartisan “Freight Rail Infrastructure 
Capacity Expansion Act” was introduced in the U.S. Senate. If enacted, this bill would provide a 
25% tax credit for investments in rail infrastructure (AAR 2006b).  Enhanced rail system capacity 
is therefore likely to be a major public policy issue in the next decade as the public and customers 
push for a system that may well be more than the industry on its own can afford.  The rail industry 
and public agencies will have to work more closely together to achieve what they all desire – an 
effi cient, profi table rail system that is able to provide quality service, attract more traffi c, and help 
alleviate problems related to highway congestion, dependence upon imported oil, and environmental 
quality.  
Endnotes 
1. The revenue per ton-mile is not a price index, as it does not provide a comparison of prices 
charged for similar shipments.  However, any distortions introduced by using this extrapolation 
for 2000-2004 are believed to be minor compared with the magnitude of the changes in prices 
and productivity over the last 10 to 20 years.
2. The service unit costing approach has commonly been used for decades in service planning 
and engineering studies to evaluate tradeoffs involving operating plans, track structure, and 
equipment.  The unit costs can be estimated in two ways.  One way is to allocate each category 
of expense for a base year to the most relevant service unit, e.g., track expense can be related 
to gross ton-miles.  Another way is to estimate unit costs for what are believed to be the most 
important cost drivers.  One earlier study allocated expenses to eight service units for a base 
year of 1978 as part of an analysis of productivity changes in the rail industry between 1972 
and 1983 (Martland 1989).  The most important of these service units were used in an expanded 
study of productivity changes between 1965 and 1995 (Martland 1999). That study used the unit 
costs from 1978, which were found to be reasonable for 1995, as the effects of infl ation were 
offset by improvements in technology and in labor productivity The AAR no longer reports 
yard hours, so that portion of the analysis was dropped from the current study.
3. Engineering and operating considerations clearly indicate that train-miles are relevant for train 
crews, ton-miles for maintenance of way, and car-miles for maintenance of equipment.  Other 
transportation employees would ideally be related to yard and train-switching, but these service 
unites are no longer reported by the AAR.  The choices of appropriate service units for the other 
two categories are less clear as the number of professionals, clerks, and executives conceivably 
could be related to tons, carloads, shipments, or a combination of various factors.  Carloads was 
deemed to be the best measure because most transactions relate more to cars handled than to the 
other measures.   
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4. Route-miles is a measure of the distance between points served by the railroad.  Track-miles 
measures the length of the tracks, taking into account passing sidings, sections of multiple 
track, and yard tracks.  
5. In 2005, the Class I freight railroads invested $6.9 billion in capital expenditures.  In 2006, they 
planned to spend $8.3 billion (AAR 2006a).
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